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A. HISTORY 
Since the end of World War II the international monetary system was based 
on the agreement signed at Bretton Woods on 22 July 1944 which basically 
encompassed a system of fixed exchange rates with an adjustment proce-
dure and the obligation of the United States of America to redeem dollars into 
gold. It was combined with the establishment of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development - the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It became the legal basis for the supremacy of the 
U.S. dollar. 
 
The tensions within the system of fixed exchange rates grew rapidly through-
out most of the 1960s partly because of domestic spending programs in the 
U.S. (“Great Society”) and the cost of the war in Vietnam. The dollar was 
considered overvalued but the envisaged adjustment procedure could not 
work as the system depended crucially on the fixed convertibility rate be-
tween the dollar and gold. As a result the system was dissolved between 
1968 and 1973. The final turning point was the "temporary" suspension of the 
dollar's convertibility into gold in August 1971, declared unilaterally by U.S. 
President Richard Nixon. All attempts to re-establish fixed exchange rates in 
the following months failed, so by March 1973 all major currencies floated 
against each other.  
 
Although the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had been cre-
ated specifically to make the system of Bretton Woods function smoothly, 
especially to prevent and to mitigate current account imbalances, both institu-
tions survived until the present. Their growing weight and the assumed new 
functions, e.g. in the context of the European stabilization facilities and   4
mechanisms,
1
 raise serious concerns about the proper legal basis of this 
practice. 
 
As the system of Bretton Woods provided relatively stable monetary condi-
tions and the European communities had very limited tasks to perform, the 
Member states saw no need to establish a closer monetary cooperation in 
the treaties of 1951 and 1957. Nonetheless, just a few years later the idea of 
a common currency for the EEC Member States was put on the agenda of 
the European Commission and was first addressed in its Memorandum of 24 
October 1962 (the Marjolin Memorandum). Herein the Commission proposed 
that the customs union should evolve into an economic union by the end of 
the 1960s with irrevocably fixed exchange rates between the currencies of 
the Member States.
2
 But still, there was no consensus about the economic 
need of such a common currency. 
 
With the increasing strains on the system of Bretton Woods the question be-
came more urgent. The complex system of fixed prices set up under the 
common agricultural policy was jeopardized by the balance of payments and 
currency crises inside the European communities. The dragging discussions 
about a devaluation of the French franc and the revaluation of the German 
mark
3
 added to the insecurities.  
 
The incompatibility of frequent exchange rate adjustments or even floating 
exchange rates within the European Communities (Union) should be kept in 
mind when deliberating the exit of Greece from the Monetary Union and the 
re-introduction of the Greek drachme which could then be devalued. These 
ideas, frequently suggested by economists, might be plausible in a scholarly 
                                            
 
1
  Infra p. 62. 
2
  Scheller (2006), p. 17.   5
seminar, but are aloof from the real world and neglect the texture of the Eu-
ropean Union. 
 
In February 1969, a report of the French member of the Commission and 
later Prime Minister Raymond Barre, proposed greater coordination of eco-
nomic policies and closer monetary cooperation.
4
 The two fields he ad-
dressed were eventually introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht
5
 in the legal 
framework of the Community and have become the cornerstones of the Eu-
ropean Economic and Monetary Union.
6
 But until today, it has remained an 
open question, whether common economic policies are an essential prereq-
uisite for the functioning of a monetary union, or whether a monetary union 
(automatically) leads to a common economic policy.
7
 
 
 
I. Werner plan  
The Barre-report inspired the Heads of State or Government to make the 
economic and monetary union (EMU) an official goal for further integration at 
their meeting on 1 und 2 December 1969 at The Hague. They agreed that 
the Council of Ministers should develop a plan to introduce step by step such 
a union but emphasizing that “the development of monetary cooperation 
should be based on the harmonization of economic policies”.
8
 Hence, the 
                                                                                                                            
 
3
 See  Siekmann (1985), p. 36 et seq.  
4
  Commission Memorandum to the Council on the co-ordination of economic policies and 
monetary co-operation within the Community, submitted on 12 February 1969, Bulletin of 
the EC no. 1, 1971.  
5
  Signed 7 February 1992, Official Journal, 29 July 1992, C 191/1. 
6
  Now Part three, Title VIII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
consolidates version, Official Journal, 30 March 2010, C 83/1 (96).  
7
  For details see infra, p. 40.  
8
  Final communiqué at no. 8: „… a plan by stages should be drawn up by the Council dur-
ing 1970 with a view to the creation of an economic and monetary union“, Compendium   6
Council set up a group of experts, chaired by the then Prime Minister of Lux-
embourg, Pierre Werner, to draw up a report on how this goal might be 
reached by the end of the decade.
9
 The group presented its final report in 
October 1970.
10
 In fulfilment of the expressed expectations a three-stage plan 
was devised realizable within the time frame of ten years.
11
 Its key elements 
were: 
  Total and irreversible convertibility of currencies; 
  Elimination of margins of fluctuation in rates of exchange; 
  Irrevocable fixing of parity ratios; 
  Total liberation of movements of capital; 
  Adoption of a single currency which would guarantee the irre-
versibility to the undertaking; 
  Setup of two Community organs: a centre of decision for eco-
nomic policy and a Community system for the central banks.
12
 
In addition to these institutional provisions, it was recommended that “princi-
pal decisions of economic policy will be taken at Community level” and that 
the “budgetary policy of the Member States will be conducted in accordance 
with Community objectives”. To achieve this, a “Community survey” was to 
be effected “before the Governments draw up their budget proposal on a de-
finitive basis”.
13
 The plan added a third element added to the main goals of 
the Barre-report (greater coordination of economic policies and closer mone-
                                                                                                                            
 
of Community Monetary Texts (register no. P 5/88), p. 13 (15); published also in: Krä-
genau/Wetter (1993), p. 97. 
9
  Decision of the Council of 6 March 1970 regarding the procedure in the matter of eco-
nomic and monetary cooperation, Compendium of Community Monetary Texts (register 
no. P 5/88), p. 17.  
10
  „Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and 
monetary union in the Community“, Luxembourg 8 October 1970. An interim report had 
been presented to the Council on 20 May 1970.  
11
  Report, p. 14, 26.  
12
  Report, p. 26.  
13
  Report, p. 27.    7
tary cooperation): control of budgetary policy of the Member States, which 
would later become a major field of dispute and an alleged source of instabil-
ity. 
 
Thus the fundamental points which dominate the debate until present were 
clearly envisaged: 
 a  common economic policy conducted by the Community 
  harmonization of the budgetary policy of the Member States.  
A political union was not considered to be a necessary prerequisite for the 
monetary union and the single currency. Instead the economic and monetary 
union appeared “as a leaven for the development of political union”. Only in 
the long run it appeared “to be unable to do without.”
14
  
 
With the collapse of the system of Bretton Woods and the ensuing wave of 
instability on the foreign exchanges no further measures were taken to im-
plement the plan. 
 
 
II. Delors plan 
After various attempts to bring the free floating currencies to a closer align-
ment within the European Community, the drive for a monetary union gained 
new momentum more than fifteen years later. At the summit meeting on 27 
and 28 June 1988 in Hannover it was agreed to form (again) a group of ex-
perts and central bank governors to promote the envisaged monetary union. 
It was chaired by the then president of the Commission, Jacques Delors. The 
report of the group was presented April 17, 1989 and proposed the introduc-
tion of an economic and monetary union in three stages. In a first step, all 
obstacles to the free flow of capital within the Community should be abol-
                                            
 
14
  Report, p. 26.    8
ished. The beginning of the second step should be marked by the foundation 
of a European Monetary Institute. With the third step all monetary compe-
tences of the member states should be transferred to the new European 
Central Bank.
15
 The report emphasized again the need for 
  a greater coordination of economic policies, 
  Rules on the size and financing of national budgets deficits, 
  Creation of a completely independent institution for the con-
duction of the monetary policy of the Union, the European 
Central Bank (ECB). 
 
Even though there was a lot of criticism of the plan, its major elements were 
accepted in the intense negotiations prior to the Treaty of Maastricht.
16
 
 
 
III. Maastricht Treaty 
The Monetary Union and the provisions about the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (ESCB) were finally introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992.
17
 Its organic law, the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank, was not left to ensuing legislation. It was 
also not left to the new institutions itself. It was in total formulated by the sign-
ing parties and added to the Treaty as a protocol. A protocol is legally an in-
tegral part of the primary law of the EU
18
 even though certain very small parts 
                                            
 
15
  Description of the development by Issing (2008a), p. 4 seq. 
16
  Supra note 5.  
17
  Supra note 5.  
18
  Article 51 TEU.    9
of the statute can be amended in a procedure outside of a revision of the 
Treaty.
19
 
 
All Member States are expected to join the EMU at one point in the future 
once they fulfill the convergence criteria. In the course of the negotiations the 
United Kingdom obtained a provision which allowed it to refrain from entering 
the third stage of the EMU even if it fulfilled the convergence criteria (opt-out 
clause).
20
 As the Treaty was rejected by a referendum in Denmark, the coun-
try was granted an exemption as well.
21
  
 
 
IV. Introduction of the euro 
With the beginning of the year 1999, the last, irrevocable step towards the 
implementation of the monetary union had been taken.
22
 The exchange rates 
of the old currencies towards the euro were irrevocably fixed and the euro 
was officially introduced in the eleven Member States which had been admit-
ted to the euro. The participating countries were Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
                                            
 
19
  This clause has been used in 2008 to change Article 10.2. of the Statute to introduce a 
rotation system in the Governing Council.  
20
  „1. Unless the United Kingdom notifies the Council that it intends to adopt the euro, it 
shall be under no obligation to do so. (…) 3. The United Kingdom shall retain its powers 
in the field of monetary policy according to national law“, Protocol (no 15) on certain pro-
visions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Official Jour-
nal C 83, 30 March 2010, p. 284.  
21
  The exemption had the effect that all Articles and provisions of the Treaty and the Statute 
of the ECSB referring to a „derogation“ should be applicable to Denmark. The admission 
procedure of Article 140 TFEU should only be initiated at the request of Denmark, No. 1 
and 2 of the Protocol (No 16) on certain provisions relating to Denmark, Official Journal 
C83, 30 March 2010, p. 287 
22
  It was criticized as too early by 155 German professors of economics, Wim Kösters, 
Manfred Neumann, Renate Ohr, Manfred Vaubel, et al. in: Frankfurter Allgemeine of 9 
February1998, p. 15.   10
Finland.
23
 For a limited period of time it was only used for interbank business 
parallel with the old currencies. On January 1, 2002 euro notes and coins 
were introduced; also in Greece which had been admitted in the meantime.
24
 
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia followed. Estonia was the last one to 
join on 1 January 2011.  
 
The United Kingdom and Denmark did not adopt the euro according to the 
exemptions granted to them.
25
 Sweden did not continue the process of intro-
ducing the euro
26
 although it fulfilled all requirements to do so. As a result, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom are EU Member States but do 
not use the single European currency so far.  
 
The term “euro area” describes the Member States in which the euro is legal 
tender. In addition to the Member States, the euro is used as legal tender in 
three other European countries on the basis of a formal agreement following 
Article 219 para. 3 TFEU, which also allows them to issue euro coins: San 
Marino,
27
 Monaco
28
, and the Vatican
29
. Andorra introduced the euro on a uni-
lateral basis but is negotiating a treaty with the European Union. The euro is 
                                            
 
23
  Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of the Council, 3/5/1998, Official Journal. 11 May 1998, 
L 139/1; judged as no infringement of fundamental rights in Germany, Federal Constitu-
tional Court, BVerfGE 97, 350 (370 f.); confirmed BVerfG (K), Neue Juristische Woch-
enschrift 1998, 3187.   
24
  The questionable actions of the Greek government preceding it are described by the 
Commission in its official „Report on Greek Government Deficit and Debt Statistics“ of 
8. 1. 2010, COM(2010) 1 final. 
25
  Supra note 20 and 21. 
26
  Automatic consequence of the decision of the EU Council of 3 Mai 1998 and Article 121 
para. 1 phrase 3 TEC.  
27
  Official Journal, 27 July 2001, C 209, p. 1.  
28
  Official Journal, 31 Mai 2002, L 142, p. 59.  
29
  Official Journal, 25 October 2001, C 299, p. 1; amended by Council decision 
2003/738/EC of 7 October 2003.    11
also used in a number of third countries without a formal agreement and in 
overseas departments, territories and islands which are either part of or as-
sociated with euro area Member States. Furthermore, there are a number of 
countries, regions and territories which have pegged their currency to the 
euro. The euro is, however, not legal tender there.
30
  
 
The agreements with Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican to use the euro 
are being renegotiated. This will correct some shortcomings in their imple-
mentation and possibly increase the maximum volume of coins these coun-
tries are entitled to issue, which in turn will increase their revenue from mint-
ing them. The new agreement with the Vatican came into effect 1 January 
2010,
31
 while negotiations with San Marino are still ongoing. Discussions with 
Monaco were scheduled to be launched in 2010. 
 
 
B. FORMATION 
I. No close political union 
According to the Werner Plan a common currency for all members of the Eu-
ropean Community was to be set up to foster further integration. It was treat-
ed as a tool for further integration and not so much a result of the integration, 
even though in the long run a closer political union appeared to be indispen-
sable.
32
 The Maastricht Treaty introduced the economic and monetary union 
in fact without a full fledged political integration. The euro was created as a 
                                            
 
30
  For more details see: Monetary and exchange rate arrangements of the euro area with 
selected third countries and territories, European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, April 
2006, p. 87; European Commission (2008), p. 122.  
31
  Official Journal, 4 February 2010, C 28, p. 13.  
32
  Supra p. 7.    12
currency without a state.
33
 This was done fully aware of the fact that many 
critics, namely economists, considered this procedure as taking the second 
step before the first.
34
 Even if this closer political union was not realized from 
the beginning on, the single currency extends and completes the “single 
market”. To this extent, it worked as “integration via the Economy”.
35
 
 
 
II. No fiscal federalism or equalization system  
Great care was taken by the framers of the Maastricht Treaty that the mone-
tary union did not include any trait of a federal equalization system. All Mem-
ber States were supposed to remain fully responsible of their finances and 
absolutely no expectations should be nourished that outside help would 
come in case of budgetary problems.
36
 The capital markets were to provide 
the appropriate sanctions for an unsound fiscal policy. Permanent instru-
ments to prevent an irresponsible fiscal policy were included in the legal 
framework besides the screening at admission time. Both safeguards
37
 alleg-
edly did not fulfill its tasks properly.
38
 
 
In the past, many governments had habitually tried to solve budgetary prob-
lems by lowering the internal or external value of the currency or both: infla-
tion and/or devaluation. Both mechanisms usually did not raise the economic 
strength of a country and helped only for a very limited amount of time to 
                                            
 
33
  A topic which was treated intensively by one of the leading framers from the German side 
and later member of the Executive Board of the ECB Otmar Issing, see e.g. Issing 
(2008b).  
34
  See more infra p. 53.  
35
 Described  by  Issing (2008c), p. 299 et seq.  
36
  Smits (1997), p. 77.  
37
  More on the safeguards to guarantee permanent stability of the EMU infra at part D. 
38
  Louis (2010), p. 979; for the Stability and Growth Pact see infra p. 56.    13
overcome the underlying structural problems. In the EMU they should –
 legally – not be any more at the disposition of countries whose currency is 
the euro.  
 
On the EU level it was envisioned that the root causes of the problems 
should be approached by developing greater economic strength which even-
tually leads to the necessary convergence. This is also the reason for the 
existence of the many (coherence) programs of the EU to improve the infra-
structure of defined areas or to solve structural economic deficits. They are 
definitely different from an equalization system as the funds are earmarked 
and are not at the general disposition of a government. The crucial point is 
improving the competitiveness of the Member State(s) which are in need.  
 
 
III. The single currency as legal tender of the Union 
The single currency was designed to be the official currency of the European 
Union; the only official currency in the Union. For this purpose the single cur-
rency had to become legal tender in all member states; the only legal ten-
der.
39
 All other currencies or means of payment had to cease to fulfil this 
function. In other words, the member states had to give up a substantial part 
of their sovereign powers:
40
 the power to create and maintain a currency as 
legal tender and to conduct monetary policy.  
 
The power to create money in the legal sense of the word had been widely 
considered to be a sovereign right of a ruler but it is not indispensable as his-
tory shows. There have always been realms without a single currency or a 
currency of the central state. In any case, the general decision to transfer this 
                                            
 
39
  Article 128 para. 1 TFEU.  
40
  Issing (2008c), p. 301.    14
sovereign right to the EU has been taken and the judiciary did not object.
41
 
Only the scope of this transfer is debateable. 
 
 
C. THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS AND THE 
EUROSYSTEM 
The Treaty of Maastricht has added monetary policy to the competences of 
the European Union and provided the necessary institutional setup. This was 
done by installing the complete legal framework for the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB). All EU Member States, even those that have not 
adopted the euro because of a special status or because of derogation, are 
part of the ESCB. It is the system as a whole and not only a subset of it 
which is charged by the Treaty to “conduct the monetary policy of the Un-
ion”.
42
 This is a consequence of the original idea that the euro shall become 
the – single – currency of the Union. Despite all disputes and difficulties 
monetary policy has become one of the major fields of common power and 
coherence of the Union. 
 
 
I. Institutional setup 
1. The general outlay 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is made up of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of all 27 EU 
member states.
43
 The Governing Council of the ECB decided in November 
1998 to adopt the term “Eurosystem” for the ECB and the national central 
banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro. This step was taken 
                                            
 
41
  BVerfGE 89, 155; 97, 350; Siekmann (2009), Article 88 no 33.  
42
  Article 127 para. 2 first indent, Article 282 para. 1 phrase 2 TFEU    15
in order to help the public understand the complex nature of the ESCB and to 
underscore that these are the instruments by which the ESCB carries out its 
tasks. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced the term in the primary law of the Un-
ion.
44
  
 
The ESCB as such has no legal personality and no organs of its own. It is 
governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB
45
: the Governing Council 
and the Executive Board of the ECB and temporarily by the General Council, 
as long as this body exists.  
 
2. The European Central Bank 
As the euro was designed to be the official currency of the EU, the ECB is an 
institution of the EU
46
 and not a separate autonomous entity under European 
Law,
47
 not a “community” of its own.
48
 Whether it is an “organ” of the EU is of 
secondary importance
49
 even if the use of the term “organ” in the German 
version of the Lisbon treaty raised quite a bit of concern, namely at the Bun-
                                                                                                                            
 
43
  Article 282 para. 1 TFEU.  
44
  Article 282 para. 1 phrase 2 TFEU.  
45
  Article 129 para. 1, Article 282 para. 2 phrase 1 TFEU. 
46
  ECJ of 10 July 2003 C-11/00, in: Europarecht 2003, p. 847 (870); Dutzler (2003), p. 86: 
„It [the ECB] is hence, in spite of its separate legal personality and its independence, not 
a third party to the Community, but an instrument of the Community set up to achieve one 
of its objectives“; Kempen (2003), Article 107 no. 4; Gaitanides (2005), p. 52; Häde 
(2011), Article 282 TFEU no. 38; implicitly: Torrent (1999), p. 1230; Amtenbrink/de Haan 
(2002), p. 73 et seq. 
47
  Favouring the classification as an independent and separate entity under European law, 
however: Weber (1998), p. 1465 et seq.; Zilioli/Selmayr (1999), p. 285; Zilioli/Selmayr 
(2000), p. 621, 643; Zilioli/Selmayr (2001), p. 19; critical: Häde (2002), p. 921; Häde 
(2006), p. 1605 et seq. 
48
  This is the wording of Selmayr (1999), p. 2433 et Seq. 
49
 See  Fang (2006), p. 95 after extensively discussing the question.   16
desbank.
50
 It is, however, only a misleading translation
51
 as both the English 
and the French version use the word “institution”.
52
  
 
The ECB has legal personality
53
 and enjoys the most extensive legal capacity 
accorded to legal persons under the respective national laws of each Mem-
ber State. It has been awarded all privileges and immunities that are neces-
sary to carry out its tasks. The powers and authorities of the ECB are not 
delegated. They are directly derived from the Treaty. So the system is not 
simply one of the many European agencies set up by secondary law of the 
Union which are eventually responsibly to the commission.
54
 
 
At its installation, the ECB was not mentioned in the former Art. 7 TEC which 
contained a list of the institutions of the Community. Instead it had a separate 
legal basis in the Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty changed this and lists the ECB 
now among other institutions in Article 13 TEU. The ESCB as a whole has 
retained, however, a separate legal basis.
55
  
 
                                            
 
50
  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003); less sceptical the ECB: Stellungnahme der Europäischen 
Zentralbank vom 19. September 2003, Official Journal C 229, 25 September 2003, p. 7-
11.  
51
  Siekmann (2005), p. 50 et seq.  
52
  Article 13 para. 1 TEU, part 6, title I, chapter 1 TFEU.  
53
  Article 282 para. 3 phrase 1 TFEU.  
54
  A comprehensive list is given by Callies (2011), Article 13 TEU, no. 38; see extensively 
Fischer-Appelt (1999), Görisch (2009). There are in fact growing legal concerns about 
agencies which shall be granted independence solely on the basis of secondary law like 
regulatory bodies for the energy market, Article 35 sec.4 Directive 2009/72/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 Official Journal L 211, 14 August 
2009, p. 55 - electricity; Article 39 sec.4 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 13 July 2009 Official Journal L 211, 14 August 2009, p. 94 – natural 
gas; Regulation (EC) 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 Official Journal L 211, 14 August 2009, p. 15. 
55
  Article 282 (1) TFEU    17
The ECB was originally endowed with a capital of 5.000 million euro.
56
 Sole 
subscribers and holders of the capital are the national central banks and not 
the Member States.
57
 The capital can be augmented by the bank up to a sum 
authorized in advance by the EU-Council. Already in 2000 the Council has 
granted authority to increase the capital by up to 5.000 million euro.
58
 This 
authorization has been used on 15 December, 2010. The capital of the bank 
does, however, not serve the same function as equity in commercial banks 
as the ECB is basically a government entity, although with a special status, 
and has the privilege to produce the money needed to pay back its (internal) 
debt. Capital adequacy rules are not applicable.  
 
The internal structure of the ECB is in principle formed by three bodies: 
(1) the Governing Council  
(2) the Executive Board 
(3) the General Council  
 
(1) The Governing Council of the ECB is made up of the members of the Ex-
ecutive Board of the ECB and the governors of the national central banks of 
the Eurosystem. It has to meet at least ten times a year. The current fre-
quency is twice a month; usually on the first and third Thursday of each 
month. The President of the EU Council and a member of the EU Commis-
sion are entitled to attend the meetings but without right to vote. 
 
The Governing Council’s tasks are of utmost importance to the ESCB. The 
Statute empowers it inter alia to formulate the monetary policy, adopt guide-
lines and take decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the ESCB’s 
                                            
 
56
  Article 28.1. of the Statute.  
57
  Article 28.2. of the Statute.  
58
  Regulation 1009/2000 of 8 may 2000.   18
responsibilities. The Governing Council takes into account the implications 
for the euro area as a whole when it makes decisions.  
 
(2) The Executive Board is composed of the President and the Vice-
President of the ECB and four other members. They are selected “from 
among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in mone-
tary and banking matters” and are appointed by the European Council, acting 
by a qualified majority, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has 
consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the Euro-
pean Central Bank.
59
 The board generally meets once a week.  
 
(3) The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) refers only 
to two decision making bodies of the ESCB, the Governing Council and the 
Executive Board. Nonetheless, the General Council is the third decision mak-
ing body of the ECB. It had been constituted only as temporary body, until all 
EU member states have adopted the euro. It consists of the President and 
the Vice-President of the ECB and the governors of the national central 
banks of all EU member states. The other members of the Executive Board, 
the President of the EU Council and a member of the EU Commission, are 
also allowed to attend the meetings but do not have voting rights.  
 
3. The national central banks 
Within this framework the national central banks are of a double nature. They 
are created by national law and are subject to national law. Simultaneously 
they are integral parts of the ESCB.
60
 In this capacity they are (parts of) a 
European institution as well. They are instruments in the hands of the ECB to 
discharge its duties and have to follow its instructions. In this capacity they 
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60
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participate in all immunities and privileges the law of the Union provides for 
the ESCB. But – on the other hand – they exert substantial influence over the 
ECB as the heads or governors of the national central banks are members of 
the governing council of the ECB. 
 
The national central banks of the countries which have not introduced the 
euro are also members of the ESCB, but, in comparison to the countries that 
have adopted the euro, they have a special status. These national central 
banks have retained their monetary sovereignty. This means that they are 
still responsible for the national monetary policy and are excluded from taking 
part in the core activities of the Eurosystem. Even though they do not carry 
out the primary functions of the Eurosystem, they are committed to the prin-
ciples of price stability-oriented monetary policy. In addition, they are bound 
to work closely with the Eurosystem in several fields, like statistics. The insti-
tutional forum for this cooperation is the General Council. 
 
 
II. Price stability as primary objective  
The Monetary Union was designed to be a community of stability. Stability 
was initially understood as price stability and only price stability. Price stabil-
ity was set as superior goal for the new monetary system in all legal docu-
ments. Financial stability in a wider sense played only a marginal role.
61
  
 
Price stability is laid down as one of the governing principles of the Union in 
Art. 3 para. 3 subpara. 1 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). For the 
Monetary Union it is reiterated in various places in the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU); there not only as one among other 
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  It is mentioned in Article 127 para. 5 TFEU as an objective the ESCB shall contribute to: 
“The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of 
the financial system”.    20
goals but as its primary objective. To underline the importance and priority of 
this objective the chapter on monetary policy begins with the phrase: “The 
primary objective of the European System of Central Banks … shall be to 
maintain price stability.”
62
  
 
Only without prejudice to this primary objective, the ESCB shall also support 
the general economic policies in the Union with regard to contributing to the 
achievements of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on Europe-
an Union.
63
 In addition, it shall act in line with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition.  
 
The term price stability in the legal documents is generally interpreted in the 
sense of consumer price stability.
64
 This is explicitly done by the protocol on 
the convergence criteria.
65
 Consumer price stability is generally measured by 
the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) calculated by the European 
office of statistics (ESTAT)
66
. Asset prices and their tendency to form bubbles 
were not envisaged by the framers of the Treaty.  
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  Endler (1999), p. 65 et seq. with comprehensive discussion of the various alternatives 
and concepts; Gaitanides (2005), p. 20; Siekmann (2009), Article 88 no.29; Blanke 
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  Protocol (No 13) on the convergence criteria, Official Journal C83, 30 March 2010, 
p. 281. 
66
  The office has the rank of general direction of the Commission and is attributed to the 
Commissioner for administration, audit and fraud prevention. It is not entrenched in the 
primary law of the Union and has not been awarded a guaranteed independence. Solely 
in a „practical arrangement“ on the „working relations“ between the office and the mem-
bers of the Commission, cabinets and services have been acknowledged certain free-
doms (agreement between the competent commissioner, Olli Rehn, and the director gen-
eral  DG ESTAT  Walter Radermacher of 11 may 2010).    21
III. Tasks and Powers 
The ECB is entrusted with carrying out the central banking functions for the 
euro. It commands all powers necessary to fulfil this task. The banknotes is-
sued by the Eurosystem are the only such notes to have the status of legal 
tender within the Union.
67
 Member States may, however, issue euro coins. 
They may be considered as a modified“national” means of payment.
68
 The 
right of governments to issue coins has been an old tradition even in coun-
tries with a central bank which is granted guaranteed independence and cen-
tralized money creating power. There is no material justification to continue 
with this tradition.
69
 The profit for the treasury from minting coins is not a suf-
ficient reason. However, prior approval by the ECB is necessary to prevent 
undue interference with its monetary policy.
70
 
 
Moreover, the ESCB has to carry out four main tasks. They are: 
−  to define and implement the monetary policy of the Union, 
−  to conduct foreign-exchange operations (that have to be consistent with 
an international foreign exchange system in case this has been set up), 
−  to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States, 
−  to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
71
 
 
Although the tasks have been assigned explicitly to the ESCB, at least the 
monetary policy is performed as a task of the Union. This can be easily de-
rived from the superscription of this part of the treaty “union policies and in-
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  Article 128 para. 1 phrase 1 and 2 TFEU; repeated in Article 282 para. 3 phrase 3 TFEU 
with no additional meaning, see Häde (2011), Article 282 TFEU no. 43.  
68
  Seiler (2004), p. 67.  
69
  Siekmann (2009), Article 88 no. 20.  
70
  Article 128 para. 1 phrase 2 TFEU.  
71
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ternal actions” and the wording in Article 127 para. 2 first indent TFEU.
72
 It 
should, however, be considered that in effect not the complete ESCB is car-
rying out these tasks but mainly the Eurosystem.
 73
 The monetary policy is 
adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB. The Executive Board of the 
ECB gives instructions to the national central banks in order to implement the 
monetary policy of the Governing Board. The authority to define and imple-
ment the monetary policy of the Union allows the ECB to exert a dominant 
influence on money market conditions and money market interest rates.  
 
The ECB does not have to fulfil all its duties with own personnel. It can use 
the national central banks as its “executive arm”.
74
 As a result some of the 
day to day work is performed by the national central banks. This comprises 
also the purchase of “sovereign” bonds and private debt instruments, like in 
the covered bond program. The legal ownership of these instruments might 
be essential in case of a default. Also the respective liabilities in this case are 
an open and not sufficiently scrutinized issue. The primary law explicitly ap-
proves that both the ECB and the national central banks may in fact issue 
euro banknotes
75
, but the exclusive responsibility for the material decisions 
stays with the ECB. 
 
To carry out the tasks entrusted to the ESCB the European Central Bank has 
been granted the power to: 
− adopt  regulations 
− take  decisions. 
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  Häde (2011), Article 127 no. 11.  
73
  The Article was designed on the premise that eventually all Member States would intro-
duce the euro and that there would be no significant difference between the Eurosystem 
and the EU. 
74
  Siekmann (2009), Article 88 no. 44.  
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−  make recommendations and deliver opinions.
76
 
 
 
D. SAFEGUARDS FOR PROCURING STABILITY OF THE EURO 
Looking at the overall picture, a host of safeguards can be highlighted which 
were included in the Maastricht Treaty to ensure that the Monetary Union 
would not only be a space of stability at its beginning,but in permanence. To 
ensure this lasting stability several carefully designed measures were imple-
mented:  
−  high admission standards (I.) 
−  far reaching and absolute independence of the monetary institutions (II.) 
−  no financing of the public sector by the ECB (III.)  
−  no privileged access of the public sector to financing (IV.)  
−  no liability for the public sector of a Member State (V.) 
−  strict fiscal discipline (VI.). 
The design of the monetary union as a permanent community of stability 
(“Stabiltätsgemeinschaft”) was a major aspect for the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany to accept the Maastricht-Treaty and the introduction of the 
euro as constitutional.
77
 
 
 
I. High admission standards 
Although the single currency was originally designed to become the currency 
of the European Union, it was soon realized that this could not be achieved in 
one step as the number of members of the Union had rapidly grown. With the 
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  Article 132 para. 1 TFEU.  
77
  BVerfGE 89, 155 (200, 204): „The Treaty on the Union regulates the Monetary Union as a 
community lastingly committed to stability and specifically guaranteeing monetary stabil-
ity.“ „This concept of the Monetary Union as a community of stability („Stabilitätsgemein-  24
growing number, the Union had become increasingly heterogeneous. To 
achieve the desired minimum homogeneity among the participants of the 
single currency restrictive admission standards were set up. A high degree of 
“sustainable convergence” is required. This convergence is assessed by four 
criteria: 
−  the achievement of a high degree of price stability 
−  the sustainability of the government financial position 
−  normal fluctuation of exchange rates within the European Monetary Sys-
tem 
−  the convergence of long-term interest-rate levels.
78
  
These criteria were specified in a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty
79
 which is 
part of the Treaty and belongs to the primary law of the Union.
80
 They were 
(later) often referred to as the “Maastricht criteria”. To avoid confusion with 
the criteria for an admissible budget deficit, they should be referred to as 
“convergence criteria” as the official wording does.
81
 The convergence criteria 
are, however, only reference values.
82
 The primary law leaves some space 
for discretion on the side of the deciding bodies. This discretion was used 
namely in the case of Italy, Belgium, and later also Greece. 
 
All Member States were originally expected to adopt the euro at one point in 
the future once they fulfil the convergence criteria. Even though the Treaty of 
                                                                                                                            
 
schaft“) is foundation and object of the Germanact of assent“ (p. 205); confirmed by 
BVerfGE 97, 350 (370). 
78
  Article 140 para. 1 phrase 3 TFEU.  
79
  Protocol (No 13) on the convergence criteria, Official Journal C83, 30 March 2010, 
p. 281.  
80
  Article 51 TFEU: The Protocols and Annexes to the Treaties shall form an integral part 
thereof. 
81
  See footnote 79.  
82
  The German Federal Constitutional, however, judges them as binding basis for the con-
sent of Germany to the Treaty, BVerfGE 89, 155 (202 f.); see also Hartmann (1996), 
p. 135 et seq.    25
Lisbon has watered down this requirement to a certain extent as it has lead 
to the “official” recognition of two groups of Member States
83
, the initial ex-
pectation is still valid.  
 
 
II. Independence of monetary institutions 
An important feature of the ESCB is its independence.
84
 The ECB and the 
national central banks must not seek or take instructions from EU institutions 
or bodies, from any government of an EU country or from any other body 
when exercising powers or carrying out tasks conferred upon them by the 
Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB.
85
 This independence is not only grant-
ed to the respective bodies but to all members of them. This has been explic-
itly stated also for the members of the decision making bodies of the national 
central banks.
86
 Especially the last aspect is crucial for judging the legality of 
the pressure put recently on a member of the board of the Bundesbank by 
the president of the Republic and its chancellor. It is an open question, how-
ever, whether the guarantee also covers activities by the ECB or the national 
central banks in banking supervision.  
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  Part three, Title VIII. Chapter 4: Provisions specific to Member States whose currency is 
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  Accepted by the German Federal Constitutional Court as in accordance with the demo-
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  Article 130 phrase 1 TFEU.  
86
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The independence is usually broken down into personal independence and 
material independence.
87
 Personal independence denotes fixed tenure for 
governors of the national central banks and members of the Executive Board 
of the ECB. A minimum term of five years for governors
88
 and a non-
renewable term of office of eight years for members of the Executive Board
89
 
are demanded by EU-law to strengthen their position.  
 
In respect to the members of the Executive Board the Treaty allows a remov-
al from office only if a member “no longer fulfils the conditions required for the 
performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct”. 
This can, however, not be done as a type of “actus contrarius” by the EU-
Council. Only the European Court of Justice may - on application of the Gov-
erning Council or the Executive Board - „retire“ such a member „compulsori-
ly“.
90
 A removal from office or any pressure in this direction is illegal like in the 
present case of the Italian member of the Board, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi. A vol-
untary resignation may be in compliance with this rule. When a resignation at 
halftime is, however, agreed on in advance, like in the case of the first presi-
dent of the ECB, Willem Duisenberg, legal doubts remain. In any case, it is 
not binding.
91
 
 
The law of the European Union provides no respective general clause for the 
members of the governing bodies of the national central banks as they are 
basically governed by the respective national law. It provides, however, as a 
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  Article 14.2. subpara. 1 Statute.  
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 Article  11.4.  Statute.   
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  Heun (1998), p. 874; Kempen (2003), Article 108 TEC no. 11; Häde (2011), Article 130 
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minimum standard that a Governor may be relieved from office only if he “no 
longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he 
has been guilty of serious misconduct”.
92
 An action of the national judiciary is 
not a prerequisite of the EU-law. However, “a decision of this effect may be 
referred to the Court of Justice by the Governor concerned or the Governing 
Council.
93
 No rules were set up for other members of the governing bodies.  
 
This reluctance in regulating the interior composition of the National Central 
Banks is plausible but raises serious concerns in view of the independence of 
the Governing Council of the ECB, which takes crucial decisions on monetary 
policy and decides far reaching questions like the legally and economically 
highly problematic purchase of sovereign debt; euphemistically named 
„quantitative easing“. At least in some Member States, like Germany, all ten-
ured civil servants can be removed from office by court action and on very 
limited grounds only; not to speak of judges or members of courts of audits 
which enjoy a constitutionally guaranteed independence like all parts of the 
ESCB. This was widely ignored during the recent excitement about a mem-
ber of the board of the Bundesbank and some years ago about an alleged 
misconduct of a president of the Bundesbank. Neither the president of the 
Republic nor the government in Germany has the right to remove an official 
from office, no matter what he has committed; also not on the proposal of the 
Bundesbank. A court action is indispensable. 
 
Material independence indicates that the ECB and the national central banks 
can employ all competences and instruments that are necessary for the con-
duct of their duties freely and undisturbed. They shall be free to perform the 
monetary policy in a way they deem suitable. They are authorized to decide 
how and when to use their instruments without any undue influence from the 
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  Article 14.2. subpara. 2 phrase 1 Statute.  
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  Article 14.2. subpara. 2 phrase 2 Statute.    28
EU institutions, national government bodies or private institutions. Any kind of 
pressure is a breach of that guarantee.
94
 Even the mere attempt to exert 
pressure is illegal,
95
 no matter whether from a governmental or private body.
96
 
 
 
III. No financing of public sector by the ECB 
Any type of credit financing of the Union or the Member States by the ECB or 
by a central bank of a Member State is strictly prohibited. This prohibition is 
absolutely comprehensive. It holds not only for the Union and central gov-
ernments but for all other bodies, offices or agencies, regional, local or other 
public authorities. It includes all other bodies governed by public law and 
public enterprises.
97
 An exception is only made for those publicly owned cred-
it institutions which can be given the same access as other commercial 
banks.
98
 
 
To secure this interdiction the ECB and the national central banks may not 
purchase any debt instruments issued from the public sector. This covers 
especially government bonds. However, only the “direct” purchase is forbid-
den. This way the Eurosystem should be enabled to intervene in the markets 
to procure their proper functioning. In no way it was intended to open a back 
door for an (indirect) financing of governments. The secondary law puts it 
plainly and unambiguously: “purchases made on the secondary market must 
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  ECJ, C-11/00, margin number 134.  
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not be used to circumvent the objectives of that Article”.
99
 It is only allowed “in 
the context of monetary policy operations”.
100
 As a result, what is euphemisti-
cally and misleadingly called “monetizing” of public debt might be allowable 
for the Federal Reserve System of the U.S. but is clearly illegal for the ECB.  
 
Keeping this in mind, the purchase of government bonds that the ESCB has 
started in early summer 2010 was from the beginning on not without a legal 
risk. The longer it lasts the more it becomes legally questionable as the prop-
er functioning of the markets can hardly be used any more as a justification. 
So it is not a question of the structure of the balance sheet of the ECB when 
it demands that the support of some of the Member States with debt prob-
lems have to be supported with other tools and its purchases have to be ter-
minated immediately.  
 
 
IV. No privileged access of public sector to financing 
In a similar manner any privileged access to financial institutions by Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local 
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law or public en-
terprises is strictly prohibited as well.
101
 This prohibition is necessary as expe-
rience tells that governments like to put pressure on the banking system of its 
country to finance their budgetary deficits, as in the case of Greece. This 
might be especially true when banks are owned or controlled by government 
entities. Such a practice increases the danger of contagion and puts addi-
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  Regulation no 3603 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the 
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31 December 1993, p. 1, recital p. 1.  
100
 Hahn (1991), p. 807, from the time of drafting the clause; Heun (1998), p. 875: „unlimited 
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tional pressure on the ECB to assist as “lender of last resort” for banks, thus 
financing indirectly governments and government entities. 
 
 
V. Strict fiscal discipline  
1. Primary law 
The primary law requires the “sustainability” of the fiscal policy and offers this 
at least as a rudimentary guideline for the long term budgetary policy. It de-
clares “the sustainability of the government financial position” to be the es-
sential criterion for sustainable convergence in the framework of the econom-
ic and monetary union.
102
 Even if this clause belongs to the transitional provi-
sions it can be used as a basis for interpretation of the permanent require-
ment that “Member States shall avoid excessive government debts”.
103
 The 
United Kingdom watered this clause somewhat down as it promised only to 
“endeavor to avoid an excessive government deficit”
104
. 
 
The compliance with budgetary discipline has to be monitored by the Com-
mission and the Council on the basis of two reference values: the ratio of the 
planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product and the ratio 
of government debt to gross domestic product.
105
 The reference values are 
specified in the protocol (No. 12) on the excessive deficit procedure added to 
the Maastricht Treaty and pertained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.
106
 They read as follows: 
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−  3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross 
domestic product at market prices; 
−  60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at 
market prices.
107
  
These reference values are part of the primary law of the Union.
108
 They are 
quite frequently referred to as “Maastricht Criteria”. This might cause confu-
sion as the admission criteria mentioned above are also called “Maastricht 
Criteria”. For this reason it should always be made clear which criteria are 
meant and the latter be called “convergence criteria”.  
 
The monitoring and enforcement of the rules has to be achieved in a complex 
interaction of the Commission and the Council.
109
 They may result in admoni-
tion and recommendations.
110
 If a Member State persistently fails to imple-
ment the recommendations, sanctions may be imposed which may eventual-
ly entail a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Union or a “fine of an appro-
priate size”.
111
 In essence, both the procedural and the substantial rules for 
enforcing the requirement of permanent budgetary discipline are laid down in 
the primary law of the Union. However, really effective sanctions have not 
been embodied. Specifically an exclusion of a Member State from the Euro-
zone is not foreseen and would be illegal.
112
 In addition, substantial discre-
tionary power remained with the political bodies. 
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2. Stability and growth pact 
Already at the initiation of the monetary union serious concerns were raised 
that the procedure provided in the primary law would be too tedious and – 
above all – the political determination would be lacking to impose appropriate 
sanctions.
113
 Definitions and specifications of the rules on government debt 
and deficits and the deficit procedure had been undertaken by the secondary 
law of the Union but no reduction of the scope of discretion for imposing 
sanctions.
114
 It was mainly Germany which demanded a “stability pact” pref-
erably with automatic sanctions.
115
 This would, however, have been barely 
compatible with the discretionary powers granted to the Commission and the 
Council in the primary law. A separate treaty – complementing the provisions 
in the TEC on the monetary union - would have been questionable from a 
legal point of view as well.
116
 Changing clauses of the primary law of the Un-
ion would not be possible; supplementing them only in fields which do no yet 
fall into its competences or which have been explicitly left open to further ac-
cords.
117
 As a result the somewhat awkward type of pact that we have at pre-
sent was finally realized.  
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That is why finally the so-called Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been 
set up by secondary law of the Union. The stability and growth pact is not a 
contract in the common understanding of the word. The term “pact” was re-
tained to emphasize the underlying political consensus.
118
 It can be taken as 
a reminiscence of the initially discussed separate treaty. This has been the 
cause of some confusion in the not so well informed public. Technically the 
pact consists of one resolution of the European Council,
119
 which is not bind-
ing, and two – binding – regulations of the Council. One contains mainly sub-
stantive provisions
120
 and the other mainly procedural rules
121
. The resolution 
contains a multilateral promise to achieve an almost balanced budget in the 
medium range.  
 
The regulations are part of the secondary law of the Union. Regulation 
1466/97 was based on Article 99 para. 5 TEC and contains an early warning 
system and the obligation of the Member States to provide a stability pro-
gram. It is now often named the “preventive part” of the pact. Regulation 
1467/97 was based on Article 104 para. 4 TEC and attempts to speed up the 
procedure and to clarify it in case of an unsustainable deficit. It is called the 
“dissuasive“ or „corrective“ part of the Pact. It governs the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP). 
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Mainly on behalf of France and – ironically – Germany, these regulations 
were amended in 2005
122
, when France and Germany failed to comply with 
the reference values. The amendments left the reference criteria untouched, 
since they are part of the primary law of the Union,
123
 but allowed to take 
more circumstances into account to excuse from a failure to meet them. Dis-
cretionary powers were extended. Procedural provisions were also changed 
to make it more difficult to adopt sanctions against non-compliant Member 
States. In addition to that, the deadlines for imposing sanctions were pro-
longed.
124
 These amendments were preceded by a Council decision not to 
continue with the deficit-procedure against France and Germany which was 
later declared not to be in accordance with the European Union law by the 
Court of Justice.
125
  
 
Whereas the „convergence criteria“
126
 were set up to warrant that only such 
Member States could introduce the euro which are sufficiently homogeneous 
with respect to the rest of the euro area, the rules on economic stability and 
on budgetary deficits should guarantee the required „community of lasting 
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stability“ as the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany had demanded.
127
 
Beyond the deficit criteria it remained the goal of the goal of the EU in the 
framework of the Monetary Union that the public sector in the medium term 
should have an „almost“ balanced budget or even a surplus to have sufficient 
leeway for built-in stabilizers.
128
 
 
 
VI. No liability for the public sector of a Member State 
In scholarly debates and in the media the existence of a so-called “no bail-
out” clause is regularly assumed. This is premature as a complete interdiction 
of “bail-outs” is not clearly expressed in the Treaties. Article 125 para. 1 
TFEU only states that the Union and the Member States shall not be liable 
for the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other bodies 
governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State. Moreo-
ver, at least some type of voluntary support is prohibited as neither the Union 
or Member States shall “assume” such commitments. The assumption of 
debt is, however, not identical with financial support of a Member State in 
need. There is room for interpretation as bilateral payments or credit guaran-
tees must not necessarily be judged as “assuming” a commitment.  
 
These rules do, however, not apply to Member States of the European Union 
whose currency is not the euro. In case a “Member States with a deroga-
tion”
129
 is in “difficulties or seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its 
balance of payments” the Council can eventually grant “mutual assistance” 
and “appropriate methods” therefore.
130
 In case a “sudden crisis” in the bal-
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ance of payments occurs the Member State may take the necessary protec-
tive actions as well.
131
 
 
To complete the reasoning, another clause has to be taken into account. Ar-
ticle 122 para. 2 TFEU allows (voluntary) financial assistance under certain, 
very restrictive conditions: “Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seri-
ously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or ex-
ceptional occurrences beyond its control” such an aid may be provided. The 
clause and the wording result from a compromise. By using this phraseology 
the framers of the Treaty still show that they keenly intended to limit support 
payments to specific, extraordinary situations. Also the term “occurrences 
beyond its control” might be interpreted in different ways. It was inserted later 
in the course of the framing process of the Treaty as the original version 
wanted to restrict the aid only to a situation of natural disasters. This way any 
incentive for circumventing the rules should be excluded. The question that 
remains is whether this is an exclusive provision banning all other types of 
aid which do not fulfil its prerequisites. 
 
A complete interdiction of support apart from that could therefore only be the 
result of careful legal reasoning considering the totality of Articles 122 pa-
ra. 2, 143 para. 1, and 144 para. 1 TFEU. The purpose of the clauses is 
clear: The determination of the Member States to comply with the required 
budgetary discipline was to be strengthened and lenders were to receive a 
clear signal that there could be a (potential) risk. In effect, the opinion of legal 
scholars in Germany on the “constitutionality” of financial support by the Un-
ion or its Member States is split.
132
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E. MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE AND COMMON FISCAL 
POLICY 
Partially as a consequence of its report on intra-euro-area imbalances
133
 the 
Commission submitted a comprehensive “economic governance package” on 
29 September 2010, covering three main subjects: 
-  reinforcement of Member States’ compliance with the Stability 
and Growth Pact 
-  broadening of economic surveillance to prevent, detect and cor-
rect macroeconomic imbalances and divergences in competi-
tiveness 
-  strengthening of the enforcement mechanisms.
134
 
 
The measures to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances contain 
1.  an alert mechanism through a scoreboard 
2.  a preventive surveillance based on discussions with the 
Member States and in-depth reviews 
3.  an excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) applying to EU 
Member States 
4.  an enforcement mechanism for the euro area members.
135
 
 
Altogether six legislative proposals for concrete legal instruments were sub-
mitted. Two proposals deal with the amendment of the regulations which 
constitute in essence the stability and growth pact.
136
 The first is based on 
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Article 121 TFEU, the second on Article 126 TFEU. The regulation on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances is completely new. 
It is set up to detect imbalances and to establish a corrective procedure (“ex-
cessive imbalance procedure” – EIP).
137
 Also new is the regulation that aims 
to establish national budgetary frameworks of quality.
138
 These requirements 
for the budgetary frameworks of all Member States are based on Article 126 
para. 14 TFEU. In particular, they aim to specify the obligations of national 
authorities to comply with the provisions of Article 2 of the Protocol (No. 12) 
on the excessive deficit procedure.  
 
Two regulations deal specifically with enforcement of rules: one provides en-
forcement mechanism for the budgetary surveillance of euro area Member 
States
139
 and the other one deals with the enforcement of actions to correct 
macroeconomic imbalances in general.
140
. The effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance is based on Article 136 in combination with Article 121 
para. 6 TFEU. Both regulations allow fines not only for excessive deficits but 
also for exceeding the debt level of the reference values. The discretionary 
power of the Council is reduced significantly.
141
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The requested automatism might be realized indirectly by introducing a “re-
verse” decision making mechanism (“reverse QMV”). It leads to semi-
automatic sanctions, as they are derived directly from the normative rule and 
can only be stopped by a (“reverse”) decision with a qualified majority. It is 
assumed that such a majority will be difficult to rally support, so that sanc-
tions will be the normal case. 
 
The package will in the end also contain a “European Semester” to integrate 
the multitude of provisions into the national decision making process. 
 
 
Source: European Commission, MEMO/10/456 of 29 September 2010. 
 
The package clearly contains elements of a common fiscal policy for the 
Member States and a first step towards a macroeconomic guidance. It re-
minds in some respects of the “planification” in France and the “global steer-
ing” of the economy (“Globalsteuerung”) which had been attempted in Ger-  40
many from 1966 on but largely failed. On the other hand it will provide the 
demanded increase of transparency in the budgetary process of the Member 
States.
142
 
 
 
F. OVERALL ANALYSIS 
From the beginning on, it was an almost relentless mantra of economists that 
it was not a question if the single currency would fail but only when. To their 
surprise, the technical procedure of introducing the euro went smoothly even 
though that had been judged as challenging. But that did not keep them from 
continuing their criticism. Each of the following movements of the dollar-euro 
exchange rates was accompanied by critical comments and the inevitable 
prediction of the imminent end of the common currency - no matter whether it 
went up or down. It was never at a level that satisfied economic analysts.  
 
 
I. The “instrumental” view of the currency  
At the various stages of the introduction of the monetary union, economists 
and politicians had debated extensively, what would be the “right” path to 
take.
143
 The “economist” view, which included the majority of German econ-
omists, considered the removal of all obstacles to a truly integrated single 
market as essential.
144
 The introduction of the common currency would follow 
almost automatically and was seen as a kind of “coronation” of the economic 
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integration. In contrast, the “monetarist” approach considered the introduction 
of the single currency as a tool to enhance (economic) integration. The un-
derlying economic facts and prerequisites for the functioning of a monetary 
union play a minor role in this way of thinking.
145
 For many economists this is 
“highly questionable”.
146
 
 
In the end, the “monetarist” approach seems to have prevailed, especially as 
fixed dates were set for the start of the single currency. However, economic 
facts played a strong role in the process. No common economic policy was 
prescribed in the Treaty, but at least strong coordination mechanisms. No 
truly common fiscal policy was installed, but numerical goals for budget defi-
cits were set up, however arbitrary they might be. The vast majority of federal 
states – with one currency - did not have anything close to this at that time. 
This is too often suppressed in public debates. The admission criteria were 
almost purely based on economic coherence even if there was room for dis-
cretion.  
 
The majority of the framers of the Monetary Union, especially political lead-
ers, assigned the Monetary Union and the single currency the “role of a 
pacemaker towards political union”. Objections were expressed, but mainly 
from sources which opposed the goal of an evolvement of the European 
Communities into a federal state anyhow
 
.
147
 Others thought more in the cat-
egories of the Werner plan: development towards a political union parallel to 
the introduction of the single currency.
148
 However, the question remains 
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whether “integration via the Economy”
149
 is a viable approach. Especially us-
ing the project of a single currency to foster political objectives raises con-
cerns. From an economist’s point of view, it seems hard to perceive how the 
common currency can promote political unification. Doubts are also ex-
pressed that a strong single currency could work as a political prestige pro-
ject reducing the “might” of the U.S. dollar.
150
 On the other hand, the modern 
“fiat” money is always based on political decisions and is tied closely to legal 
rules enacted by a sovereign.
151
 It is a creation of the legal system, at least 
the monetary basis of central bank money.
152
 As a result, the act of creating a 
common currency constitutes in itself the formation of a closer political union. 
Another question is the hope or expectation that additional political objectives 
may be achieved by using it and by the work of its institutions. 
 
 
II. The performance of the euro 
Judging from the overall performance of the euro and the ESCB, it has been 
a great success, economically and politically. It did extremely well during the 
present financial crisis and the sovereign debt problems of some Member 
States are predominantly a problem of the Union and of the other Member 
States, who feel obliged to help, but not of the monetary system.
153
 The U.S. 
dollar is not endangered because the states of California and Illionois are de 
facto insolvent and have no legal claim on support by the federal govern-
ment. An indicator of the success is also the increase of the number of Mem-
ber States which have been admitted to the euro from 11 to 17. Of course, 
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part of this might be the result of strategic behavior, but costs and benefits for 
the single member have to be analysed more in depth. Even among sceptical 
economists there is little doubt on the performance of the euro as a strong 
and stable currency, worldwide accepted and increasingly used as a re-
serve.
154
 
 
The primary objective of price stability has been fully achieved. The average 
annual rate of inflation has been below 2%. Accordingly, the officially publi-
cized goal of the ECB has been fulfilled. In effect the euro has been perform-
ing better in this respect than the German Mark which serves as an unofficial 
benchmark.  
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Overall consumer price inflation 
 
 
European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, June 2011, p. 12. 
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Consumer price inflation excluding energy and food 
 
 
 
 
European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, June 2011, p. 12. 
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Harmonized index of consumer prices 
Annual percentage change  
 
 
Jürgen Stark, Staatsschuld und Geldpolitik: Lehren aus der globalen Finanzkrise, Rede, 
Münchner Seminare: CES ifo Group Munich & Süddeutsche Zeitung, München 20 Juni 
2011, slide 2 (European Central Bank). 
 
 
The external value of the euro has increased for over ten years. Few curren-
cies have appreciated against the euro during recent years. The exchange 
rate against the U.S. dollar remains at an almost all-time high, despite the 
alleged “euro-crisis”. It is of secondary importance whether this outcome 
(partially) reflects only the weakness of the dollar. The euro has been stable 
and above its fundamental value which is widely seen between 1.10 to 1.20 
USD per euro.  
 
This should be kept in mind despite the constant criticism from “experts”. 
When the exchange rate approaches 1.60, it is allegedly far too high and 
hurts the export. When it falls below 1.30, the end of the euro is close and the 
monetary union has to be dissolved soon.  
   47
Euro effective exchange rates (EER-20) 
(monthly averages, 1999 Q1=100) 
 
 
 
European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, June 2011, S 73. 
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Bilateral exchange rates  
(monthly averages, 1999 Q1=100) 
 
 
 
European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, June 2011, S 73. 
 
 
The envisaged reduction of transaction costs has been achieved as well. 
Such costs stem basically from the following sources: transformation of pric-
es into a former currency, procuring and keeping foreign currency, and the 
risk of exchange rate changes. The latter can, of course, be hedged against 
by modern financial instruments, but only at a premium. Estimates of the pos-
itive effects of the reduced transaction costs run up to 0.5% p.a. additional 
average growth for the euro-zone as a whole. In addition to that, a plethora of 
non-monetary benefits were created for consumers.   49
 
Long term interest rates have been kept low, for some Members of the euro-
zone far below the level they had to pay before the introduction of the euro. 
This is not only due to the introduction of the single currency but it is part of it. 
Low real long term interest rates lead in general to a reduction in financing 
costs and may induce (additional) investments. The low interest rates in the 
euro-zone have, however, partially proven to be a “Danaers gift”. They con-
tributed to the rise of a real estate bubble in Ireland and Spain. More detri-
mental, they induced several southern European states to increase their con-
sumptive government spending, financed by credits, to a level which is not 
sustainable. This is, however, not a flaw of the Monetary Union but of auton-
omous political and economic decisions, partially in disregard of EU law.  
 
 
Macroeconomic performance indicators 
 
 
 
European Commission, EMU@10, 2008, p. 19. 
 
 
The mere existence of the Monetary Union has been a stabilizing factor in 
the present crisis. An almost certain run for devaluation with severe destabi-
lizing effects could be avoided. A speculative attack on a small currency is 
also easier than against a big currency which is widely used. Massive inter-
vention by central banks would not have prevented the collapse of the ex-  50
change rate system,
155
 like in 1969 or 1992 when the dimension of economic 
and political strains on currencies was far smaller. 
 
 
III. The alleged structural flaws of the monetary union 
Economists had been critical of the monetary union from the beginning on. In 
their view the European Monetary Union simply could not work, or maybe it 
should not work.
156
 Several fundamental structural flaws are emphasized: 
1.  unsuitable area for a common currency 
2.  lack of a state backing the currency 
3.  insufficient political integration  
4.  lack of a truly common fiscal policy 
 
1. Unsuitable currency area 
In the past, governments had quite often tried to solve budgetary problems 
by lowering the internal or external value of the currency or both: inflation 
and/or depreciation. Both mechanisms had regularly not improved the inter-
nal economic strength of a country in the long run. The often deep rooted 
structural problems could only have been solved by a combined effort of the 
government and the economic agents. It is usually a painful und long-lasting 
endeavor and that was lacking. In a monetary union depreciation of the cur-
rency is not available any more and inflation is substantially limited as long as 
monetary policy follows the primary goal of price stability as prescribed by the 
primary law of the Union.  
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Due to this reduction of freedom of choice for governments in the area of a 
single currency it can be asked whether the area has been and is suitable for 
a single currency.
157
 The theory of optimal currency areas concentrates on 
regions.
158
 It defines as an optimal area for a currency a region, defined by 
internal factor mobility and external factor immobility.
159
 Later the degree of 
openness of an economy, the product diversity and the stability of real ex-
change rates were added. The stability of the real exchange rates became 
eventually the dominant indicator for the convergence of an area necessary 
for a common currency.
160
 Altogether the emphasis was on the cost side. The 
benefits of a common currency were taken into account later. They are diffi-
cult to assess but can  even in theory  turn the evaluation positive. Alto-
gether it boils down to an empirical assessment
161
 but there is no predefined 
borderline as it is mainly a dimensional instead of a categorical difference.  
 
When evaluating the different factors, it must not be forgotten that the intro-
duction of the Monetary Union was primarily a political decision and not an 
economic development.
162
 The economic calculation has to be added to the 
political benefits derived from such a decision. So a mere economic view is 
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too narrow.
163
 This does not, however, imply that economic facts can or 
should be neglected in a political project with an economic objective or on 
“economic rails”. A political project of this kind comes at a cost. The political 
decision making bodies have to realize – and some did from the beginning 
on
164
 - that such a project might lead to financing wants which have to be dis-
tributed.  
 
As a result, the introduction of the single currency and the acceptance of new 
members have to be judged by the marginal net benefit or net cost of the 
whole project including all political aspects. Although, once a decision has 
been taken, the cost-benefit structure changes dramatically compared to the 
situation ex ante.  
 
2. A currency without a state  
A common criticism had been that it would not be possible – or at least not 
suitable - to form a monetary union without a political union. As a minimum, a 
well coordinated economic policy and a common fiscal policy of the members 
of the monetary union was considered to be indispensable. In effect, it was 
also contended that a strong central bank needed a counterpart which 
speaks with one voice. In addition it was argued that in times of crisis a mon-
etary system needed a clear governmental unit to bear the financial burdens 
of rescue operations – both for private financial institutions and for govern-
ments.  
 
This assessment is partially due to the outdated understanding of a central 
bank as a commercial unit which has to keep its balance sheet balanced and 
might need fresh capital when its equity is eaten up. For a public law entity 
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which has the right to produce the money with which it can pay its bills, this is 
not true. There is no need – other than monetary policy reasons – to reduce 
or even discharge its debt with the consequence of a financial burden to dis-
tribute. Partially this view is based on an economic theory of the role of a 
central bank which might be true in the U.S. but is definitely false in the EU: 
The ECB is by no means allowed to finance any public sector entity. Even 
exceptional circumstances do not justify such a serious breach of law. Oth-
erwise common robbery could be justified too. 
 
From a legal point of view, it was stipulated that only a state could have a 
currency and not a supranational organization like the European Union.
165
 For 
this reason attempts were undertaken to construe the euro not as the curren-
cy of the EU but of a group of sovereign states united to form the currency. 
However, if the appropriate sovereign powers are transferred to a body gov-
erning the currency, no convincing legal reasons exist why a currency cannot 
exist without a state backing it.
166
 Even if the ECB is considered not to be a 
pillar of the Union but an independent specialized organization of Community 
law,
167
 the ECB within the framework of the ESCB can act as a governing 
body set up by public law based on a treaty. Historically, even full fledged 
states have been established by contract, e.g. the Norddeutsche Bund and 
its successor, the German Reich of 1870, which is often not realized.  
 
3. Deficits in political integration 
As early as 1957 J.E. Meade stated that a monetary union even with the then 
only six members of the EEC would require a “single European government”. 
In his view “such a government would have to be able to control central-bank 
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monetary policy and governmental budgetary policy throughout Europe”
168
 A 
closer look reveals, that a monetary system is not necessarily tied to a (cen-
tralized) political system as long as the free flow of goods, labor, and capital 
is guaranteed, the monetary institutions are granted sufficient powers and 
independence from politics, and structural discrepancies are being taken 
care of.
169
 This is especially true under the assumption that the monetary sys-
tem has as its primary objective price stability and not other goals of econom-
ic policy like growth or employment. It has to be kept in mind that the institu-
tional setup of the Federal Reserve System of the U.S. differs considerably in 
this respect from the Monetary Union of the EU.
170
  
 
However there is a strong call for a political union.
171
 The deficit of political 
integration can be specified as an unfulfilled want of an economic and fiscal 
government. It is a strongly debated question whether the rules of the prima-
ry law (Articles 119-126 TFEU) and of the Stability and Growth Pact have to 
be expanded to create a body which could be called an economic govern-
ment of the EU. This entity would outline a common economic and fiscal poli-
cy and could decide specific questions of common concern. The proposed 
economic governance package is a step in this direction.
172
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Such a development could also be seen as creating a threat to the stability of 
the currency and the independence of the ECB. Instead of changing the 
rules, the existing rules ought to be obeyed more closely.
173
  
 
4. Lack of a common fiscal policy 
A common fiscal policy is not indispensable for the functioning of a monetary 
union. Unsustainable budget deficits and debt levels do not destabilize a cur-
rency by itself. Contrary to a widespread belief, there is no direct link be-
tween an irresponsible fiscal policy and the monetary system as long as the 
financing of a fiscal deficit by the central bank is effectively inhibited and an 
obligation for support does not exist. Effective independence is decisive in 
this circumstance.
174
 The empirical studies about a contagion between deficit 
crises and currency crises are usually based on the existence of a national 
currency which does not exist in the European Monetary Union.
175
 It is an 
open question whether the EU, (not the Monetary Union) could withstand the 
aggregate pressure of media, politicians, financial institutions and specula-
tors when a Member State will not pay its debt, how small it may be in rela-
tion to the whole Union.   
 
However, budget deficits and sovereign debt levels are definitely a good 
predicator for the solvency of a state in the medium range.
176
 It is an open 
question whether the insolvency of a Member State would not be used to put 
pressure on the institutions of the monetary system; not only by politicians 
but also by the media which might be unwilling or unable to see the differ-
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ence between a budget problem and a currency problem. Only because 
many governments in the past have tried to solve their budgetary problems 
by manipulating the monetary system, it cannot simply be assumed that the 
same would happen in the Monetary Union. Even though these manipula-
tions have a long tradition, there is change. They are legally not possible in 
the European Monetary Union. It would be a clear breach of the law, even 
under extraordinary circumstances. But pressure on the ECB might be in-
creased nevertheless. 
 
It is prudent to prevent budget crises and the insolvency of a Member State. 
This could be done by market sanctions for an unsustainable deficit. Markets 
tend to react (too) late and not always in a rational manner.
177
 Serious regula-
tory flaws have also contributed considerably to the malfunction of market 
forces.
178
 The lack of a common fiscal policy might also reduce the ability to 
even out the upturns and downturns in the course of the cyclical movements 
of the economy.
179
 Legal norms, effectively enforced, may constitute the only 
way to prevent the insolvency of a state. 
 
The norms and the practice, especially the Stability and Growth Pact, alleg-
edly did not fulfill their purpose.
180
 Usually the debt criteria are used to 
demonstrate this point without taking into account that they are not strict lim-
its but reference values.
181
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Debt of general government (percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Jürgen Stark, Staatsschuld und Geldpolitik: Lehren aus der globalen Finanzkrise, Rede, 
Münchner Seminare: CES ifo Group Munich & Süddeutsche Zeitung, München 20 Juni 
2011, slide 12 (European Central Bank). 
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Net lending / net borrowing of general governments  
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
European Commission, European Economic Forecast, Spring 2011, p. 221 
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Gross debt general governments  
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
European Commission, European Economic Forecast, Spring 2011, p. 223 
 
 
The numbers demonstrate why it was prudent of the Maastricht Treaty to es-
tablish rules on a sustainable fiscal policy of the participating states to pre-
vent a situation where sanctions of the market (high interest rates, denial of 
loans) would need to remind a member of the Eurozone of its (legal) obliga-
tions.
182
 The problem is how to force Member States to follow the rules, es-
pecially big ones.
183
 But this is not a specific problem of the Monetary Union 
and Germany has faced similar problems inside the German federation for 
decades. 
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The widespread complaint about the lack of a common fiscal policy reveals 
some ignorance of the design and working of federal systems. The constitu-
tion of the United States of America does not provide for a common fiscal 
policy of the members of the federation. In contrast to Germany, it does also 
not interdict grants of the federal government to the states; conditional or un-
conditional. Often strings are attached to the grants which allow the federal 
government to exert considerable influence on the policy but this is far from a 
federal equalization system or even a common taxation.
184
 So far there is no 
clear evidence that the great autonomy of the states in the U.S. has adverse-
ly affected the functioning of the currency used there. Even the long run dis-
crepancies inside the U.S. have not threatened the stability of the whole sys-
tem.  
 
In essence, the EU appears to have more rules to secure a sound fiscal poli-
cy of its members than the U.S. has for its states, at least on a constitutional 
level; and there is no fundamental criticism that the U.S. dollar cannot work in 
a federation with so little common economic and fiscal policy. Especially rules 
on (balanced) budgets are definitely state law and requests for financial aid 
are also turned down by the federal government.  
 
Until the year 2009, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany also 
did not contain a clause restricting debt or deficit of the members of the fed-
eration. In the German constitution only a weak clause had been introduced 
in 1969 that both the central state (“Bund”) and its members (“Länder”) 
should align their fiscal policy to the requirements of the macro-economic 
balance and that for this reason restrictions on borrowing could be imposed 
by the federation. In addition to that, it could be decreed that reserves were 
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to be built up during an economic upswing which could be spent during a 
downturn to stimulate the economy. These rules were strictly reserved to 
fight business cycles and not to cope with structural deficits; and in effect 
they had little practical impact. An adverse effect on the stability of the cur-
rency could not be noticed. 
 
It took until 2009 for the federal constitution of Germany to be amended and 
to introduce for the first time binding rules on deficits for the states (“Länder”) 
by the central state (“Schuldenbremse”).
185
 Until then, the European Union 
had - also compared with the central government of Germany - more legal 
rules directing the fiscal policy of its Member States than the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. This lead to the awkward result – and it was one of the rea-
sons for the fundamental changes of the fiscal federalism in Germany in 
2009 – that the federal government could not legally force the Länder to 
avoid “excessive deficits” in order to fulfill Germany’s obligations towards the 
European Union!  
 
The amendments to the German constitution imposing stiffer rules on the 
member states of the federation abolishing basically the right of the “Länder” 
to run a structural deficit from fiscal year 2020 on, raise some constitutional 
concerns. It had been an undisputed right of the members of any kind of fed-
eration to finance part of their budget by borrowing money. Interdicting any 
structural deficit except in times of disaster might have taken away too much 
“sovereignty” from the “Länder”. They might have lost an essential part of 
their “statehood” or “sovereignty”. This would be a breach of the federal con-
stitution since the amending power is limited in Germany, Article 79 para. 3 of 
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the federal constitution.
186
 A case on this question is pending in the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany.  
 
A similar problem might arise in case the EU is transformed into a federation 
with similar rules on budgets. In a somewhat enigmatic phrase the Federal 
Constitutional Court had pointed out that the constitution would not empower 
the representatives of Germany to enter a federation and thus “give up the 
right to self-determination of the German people and its ‘Souveränität’ ac-
cording to the law of nations”.
187
 It added that changing the “identity” of the 
union and acting “ultra-vires” could render those acts of the union inapplica-
ble in Germany.  
 
 
IV. Support of Member States  
1. Preliminary support mechanisms 
The lack of general support mechanisms that had been considered a struc-
tural flaw of the Monetary Union, has been partially mitigated. A support spe-
cifically for Greece was organized ad hoc within a few days followed by an 
unspecified (general) mechanism a few days later, based on Article 122 pa-
ra. 2 TFEU. The legality of this procedure is not beyond any doubt, particular-
ly the question whether the prerequisites of that provision are fulfilled. The 
duration of that mechanism has been limited to two years – for good reasons. 
Now a permanent mechanism is being set up including an amendment of the 
Treaty.  
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(1) In May 2010 financial support was given to Greece because of the immi-
nent danger that the country could not refinance its outstanding debt and be-
cause its budget deficit, which after some corrections of the statistics reached 
a two-digit percentage of GDP. The aid was basically granted as credit guar-
antees on a bilateral basis. Greece has promised to solve its budgetary prob-
lems by a rigorous austerity program with spending cuts, tax rises and an 
overall reduction in social security benefits.
188
 
 
Whether the aid is in conformity with the principal provisions of the Treaty is 
questionable. The wording “assume the commitments” in Article 125 para. 1 
TFEU would have to be interpreted in a way that new voluntary guarantees 
by Member States would not be covered. Article 122 para. 2 TFEU could be 
a basis when the situation of the Greek finances would be considered an 
“exceptional occurrence beyond the control” of Greece. 
 
(2) Only a few days after the rescue operations for Greece the heads of 
states and government of the Member States agreed to set up a support 
mechanism on a much larger scale for future financing problems of Member 
States. It was designed to have an accumulated volume of 750 billion euro, 
distributed on three pillars: 
−  European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) (60 billions) 
−  European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (440 billions) 
−  Credits by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (250 billions). 
The lion’s share of the aid should be granted in form of guarantees and not 
as direct payments. The good credit ratings of most Member States were to 
be used to refinance the outstanding debt at much lower costs than the fail-
ing countries could have attained. The whole support mechanism is designed 
to be only of temporary nature and to terminate by 2013.  
 
                                            
 
188
 See for details Louis (2010), p. 971.    64
The European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) is an instrument of the 
European Union. It is financed from general funds of the Union and adminis-
tered by the Commission.  
 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is a separate entity set up 
by the Member States which have introduced the euro. It is designed as a 
special purpose vehicle to borrow money on the capital markets by issuing 
debt instruments guaranteed by the Member States not in need. The pro-
ceeds are passed on to the member in distress. This way there is no direct 
aid from Member States or the Union to other members. The volume of guar-
antees was distributed according to the share each member’s central bank 
holds of the capital of the ECB. The liability is limited to that fraction. Techni-
cally a corporation under the law of Luxembourg with seat in Luxembourg 
City was set up. The state of Luxembourg was the only shareholder in order 
to speed up its creation. This corporation issues bonds which are guaranteed 
by the various Member States. The corporation was given the desired top 
rating by the rating agencies.
189
  
 
The support mechanism is completed by loans from the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF). For some time there was strong resistance against the par-
ticipation of the Fund in rescue operations within the EU or more precisely in 
the euro area as it is designed to give support in the case of imbalances due 
to the lack of foreign currencies. The fund, however, possesses a lot of expe-
rience in this area and is neutral with respect to many special interests within 
the Union. In addition, there are few alternatives as long as the EU has not 
set up a fund of its own and still wants to provide aid. 
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2. The support by the ECB 
In addition to this three-pronged mechanism, the purchase of debt instru-
ments issued by Member States of the ESCB since early summer 2010 
played a considerable and growing role. The result is that a major share of 
the sovereign debt of the supported members or its banks is already held by 
the ECB. Only a fraction of it is actually bought and held by the ECB. The 
rest is carefully distributed among the national central banks. A “restructur-
ing” of sovereign debt would hit the ESCB to a great extent, although the po-
tential size of that loss is hard to gauge as it is unknown at which discount 
the instruments were purchased.  
 
The ECB has also accepted government bonds of countries with budgetary 
problems as corollary – partially in conjunction with handing out credits to 
banks from countries in need. They in turn hold a large fraction of the sover-
eign debt of their home country. This could also be considered as an “indi-
rect” financing of sovereign debt by the ECB. The size of the loss in case of a 
default is hard to assess as well. It can be assumed that the corollary in-
cludes a sizeable safety margin. 
 
As the legality of this procedure has become increasingly doubtful with time 
passing, the ECB has rightfully demanded that this task has to be fulfilled by 
the rescue mechanism set up by the EU. According to the fundamentals of 
the Monetary Union, resolving budgetary problems of Member States is in no 
way a task of the ECB or the ESCB as a whole.  
 
The recent augmentation of the capital of the ECB has not been necessary in 
view of the purchase of the “sovereign” debt instruments even if the ECB 
takes into account a certain risk that they may fail. A central bank does not 
have to follow any kind of capital adequacy rules since it cannot become in-
solvent. It can even carry on a loss on its balance sheets indefinitely. It is un-
clear whether the taxpayer eventually will have to bear a loss, as it is every-  66
thing else but sure that the Member State whose central bank finally shows a 
loss in consequence of capital requirements of the ECS will be liable for 
those losses. The same holds true for direct losses of the national central 
banks. 
 
As a summary it can be stated that the purchase of sovereign debt instru-
ments by the ECB is not simply a matter of policy or the breach of a taboo, 
but simply illegal. 
 
3. Creation of a permanent support mechanism 
The heads of states and government agreed on 17 December 2010 to lay the 
basis for a permanent support mechanism.
190
 It was recognized that it would 
be legally prudent to structure it as a (multilateral) support of the members of 
the euro zone and not of the EU.
191
 As a consequence, a new paragraph 3 of 
Article 136 TFEU was created following the procedure set up by Article 48 
TFEU to serve as a sound legal basis for this mechanism. This provision al-
lows Member States, not the EU, to grant support on a voluntary basis under 
strict conditionality.
192
 The details of the new European Stabilization Mecha-
nism (ESM) are still being negotiated.  
 
A support system might have to be installed for regions in need like in some, 
but by no means all, federally organized states. There are federations with 
great disparities that do not know an equalization system, e.g. the USA. 
However, a fiscal equalization system is partially considered to be essential 
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for the functioning of a Monetary Union but focused on stability and allocation 
excluding redistribution.
193
 
 
To avoid moral hazard and rent seeking when introducing such a mechanism 
it has to be ensured that  
  aid is provided only under strict conditions and controls 
  the necessary structural improvements are not evaded 
  lenders will have to compensate for enjoying a debtor who 
will be helped by the public 
  risk adjusted interest will be charged in the future for sover-
eign debt. 
 
All this is, however, not the task of the monetary system but of the general 
setup of an interconnected system, be it a state or not. 
 
4. Beneficiaries 
In effect, a large portion of the default-risk has been transferred already from 
private creditors to the public sector without proper compensation. Therefore 
the purchase of sovereign debt instruments by the ECB has to come to an 
end not only for legal reasons but also because of the economically not justi-
fiable risk transfer. The speculation on an illegal “bail-out” of the debtors 
would be honored for free.  
 
Moreover, another sizable portion of the sovereign debt of the Member 
States needing support is held by banks or institutions owned, taken over in 
the course of the crisis or guaranteed by the governments of Germany and 
France. This way another part of the risk of default has already been taken 
over tacitly by the tax-payers of these countries. 
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As it is unknown at which discount governmental entities including the ECB 
have acquired sovereign debt instruments or with which safety margin they 
accepted these instruments as corollary, the size of the transfer is hard to 
judge. In any case, it is realistic to assume that the profits from lending with-
out an appropriate risk premium to the Member States needing now support, 
considerably surmount the losses when selling them. A substantial subsidy is 
being handed out to the crediting financial institutions by supporting the debt-
ors. That is the reason why a contribution of the creditors is essential.  
 
 
V. The coherence problem 
There are signs that internal coherence in the Monetary Union is eroding. 
 
Current account balance as percentage of nominal GDP 
 
 
Jürgen Stark, Staatsschuld und Geldpolitik: Lehren aus der globalen Finanzkrise, Rede, 
Münchner Seminare: CES ifo Group Munich & Süddeutsche Zeitung, München 20 Juni 
2011, slide 10 (European Central Bank). 
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Imbalances in the current accounts are not the cause for a weak coherence 
but a gut indicator. Further details are significant like the appropriation of the 
financial influx from abroad. 
 
 
Weight of investments in real estate 
(percentage of GDP) 
 
 
 
Sachverständigenrat (2010), p. 86. 
 
Such kinds of developments cannot be mitigated by just any sort of fiscal 
federalism, as the examples of the U.S. or German fiscal federalism vividly 
demonstrate. To which extent these disparities might have been induced by a 
common currency is another question and remains to be analysed.  
 
Internal coherence of the members of a monetary union may be considered 
as an important factor for its viability. But even in a single currency area basi-
cally three adjustment mechanisms remain in case of disparities, mainly with 
constant and excessive current account imbalances: 
 enhancing  competitiveness   
  movement of labor to a more efficient allocation   70
 economic  growth 
If discrepancies are too great at the beginning or even increasing, this might 
lead to high additional overall costs in the form of support in time of crisis and 
programs to foster structural adjustments. But this is a political and not pri-
marily an economic decision. Also the EU would have the option to let a re-
gion turn into the Mississippi of Europe.  
 
In general the EU has decided against that option and attempts to increase 
coherence by regional development programs. It has collected comprehen-
sive information on the development of coherence in the euro area.
194
 
 
 
VI. A “euro-crisis”? 
1. Foundations 
Although many analysts and some politicians have been referring to the crisis 
as a crisis of the euro
195
 or even worse of the European Union, it is in es-
sence not a problem of the currency when a sovereign is not able or not will-
ing to pay its debt. There is no stringent link between fiscal problems of a 
state and the currency used in this country as legal tender. Only if a govern-
ment has the power to print the money it needs to pay back its debt the cur-
rency might be in danger. This is also why the ECB is not allowed to lend 
money to the EU or its Member States, Article 123 TFEU. 
 
In addition to an almost complete failure of financial markets and of economic 
sciences, the crisis has also demonstrated a total failure of the supervisory 
system – both of its rules and of their enforcement.  
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The present turmoil with sovereign debt is primarily not a problem of the cur-
rency but of the discrepancies between the Member States. It occurs in any 
type of interconnected system no matter if it uses one or more currencies. 
When a government has problems to finance its budget deficit this has no 
direct link to the currency used in this country. However, it is a consequence 
of the financial market crisis and the ensuing depression of the “real” econo-
my. Serious flaws in re-designing financial markets and financial institutions 
are the major contributing factors. On the side of the lenders, ill-conceived 
capital adequacy rules and laxness towards unsustainable, but individually 
profitable leverage ratios are of major significance. The absence of a national 
currency only forces a government to think about measures which are not 
popular at home to solve its structural problems. Not having the questionable 
exit with inflation and devaluation of the currency might be very healthy in the 
medium run. It is not a flaw of the Monetary Union that the historically low 
interest rates for some of the Member States were not used in a more pru-
dent manner.  
 
2. A Banking crisis 
It is still too early to deliver a comprehensive and final analysis of the crisis. 
Keeping in mind the complexity of what has happened it is also problematic 
to come to simple and clear-cut judgements. But with this “caveat” a few facts 
appear to be clear: 
1.  From the beginning on and also now with the turn to a „sovereign debt 
crisis“, the crisis is and has been at the core a crisis of financial institu-
tions, mainly of some big banks, but by no means all banks.  
2.  In second place, it has now become a crisis of sovereign states and 
other governmental institutions. They have amassed debt in a scale 
which is not sustainable.  
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3.  But it should not be forgotten that there always has to be someone 
who lends the money; and to a large extent it was again banks and 
other financial institutions.  
4.  The risk of write-offs of sovereign debt has increasingly been trans-
ferred from the market players to the central banks as they bought or 
accepted sovereign debt as corollary. This is augmented by the implic-
it subsidies handed out to creditors of sovereign debt.
196
  
 
 
Sovereign bond yields 
 
 
European Commission (2011), p. 41. 
 
 
Despite all the turns and twists the crisis has taken so far and might take in 
the future, it is and was in essence a crisis of banks which expand credit and   73
lend too much money and do not charge a risk adjusted prize (interest). This 
is consistent with the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff who consider the crises 
in the developed countries during the last two decades as predominantly 
caused by banks.  
 
3. The neglected side of the lenders 
So it is worthwhile to focus the analysis more on the side of the lenders. The 
bank rescue operations that took place directly increased government debt to 
GDP ratios. Private debt was turned into public debt,
197
 especially in Ireland 
but also in Germany.  But things are too complex to simply blame the finan-
cial institutions. The legal system contributed substantially to the emergence 
of the unsustainable sovereign debt situation which has to be resolved now. 
The risk weight was set at zero for basically all sovereign debt in the legal 
rules on capital adequacy.
198
 In other statutes governing financial instru-
ments
199
 or institutions, like insurance laws, it is similar. This made the irre-
sponsible lending so attractive aside from the gambling on a “bail-out” in case 
of need. As a result, market mechanisms were hindered to impose the nec-
essary sanctions on countries carrying out an unsustainable and irresponsi-
ble fiscal policy also from this side. Fatal mistakes were made in the course 
of deregulation as the necessary differences had been made in the previous 
statutory rules.  
 
                                                                                                                            
 
196
 Supra p. 68. 
197
 Baldwin/Gros (2010), p. 11.  
198
 E.g. Annex VI part 1 no 1.2.4. Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 June 2006 relative to the taking up and pursuit of credit institutions (re-
cast), Official Journal L 177, 30 June 2006, p. 1 (81). This annex contains several other 
fatal errors like treating exposures to a central government equally to on exposure to the 
ECB or relying fort he risk weight of any sovereign debt on the ratings of rating agencies 
(no. 1.1.2.). 
199
 Section 20 para. I 1 b and c of the German statute on „Pfandbriefe“.    74
Leverage ratios, maturity transformation, and general risk reduction by banks 
and other financial institutions are at the core of the problem besides waning 
competitiveness of some Member States and both are not yet addressed suf-
ficiently despite all efforts undertaken so far. Improving competitiveness is 
often identified with lowering real wages. This helps of course but the non-
economic element might be more important and is often overlooked: superior 
engineering, good science and reliable workers and an efficient legal system. 
All of these are hard to achieve.  
 
4. Solutions 
It is an open question whether the EU could tolerate the financial failure of 
one of its Member States, namely one whose currency is the euro. Originally 
it was clearly intended that there should not be any support. These rules 
were also intended as a signal to markets that there might be a higher risk 
with certain “sovereigns” debts. Until recently, markets ignored that signal 
completely. Then they overshot in the last months for a while with high fluc-
tuation of spreads. It is hard to blame markets for this, even if there might be 
a strong speculative element. In effect markets were right since so far a cred-
itor has not suffered any losses with “sovereign” debt from parts of the Eu-
rosystem.  
 
Leaving the Eurosystem or expelling a Member State whose currency is the 
euro is no viable solution for two simple reasons: It is economically harmful 
and it is illegal.
200
 The membership in the monetary union is irrevocable for 
good reasons. Monetary systems that provide an exit option are inherently 
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instable.
201
 It is the structural problems that have to be solved: weak econom-
ic growth and weak competitiveness. 
 
Development of the unit labor cost in the euro area relative to Germany 
(1998 Q4 = 100) 
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The immediate crisis resolution necessities might demand a different short 
term approach, but that is in essence not a task of the monetary system. Fi-
nally an increasing lack of obedience to strict legal norms and contracts has 
been observed, and this is – in the medium range - the most frightening as-
pect of the recent development. That should be kept in mind before keenly 
designing new rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
The European Monetary Union euro has done very well since its initiation. 
Price stability has been secured and the external value of the new currency is 
more than satisfactory. The confidence in it is also shown by its increasing 
use as a global reserve currency. It has been a stabilizing factor in the cur-
rent crisis. 
 
The recent budgetary problems of some Member States are principally not a 
problem of the Monetary Union. It is therefore in no way justified to speak of 
a “euro-crisis”. It is true, however, that the Monetary Union restricts the num-
ber of possibilities for Member States to solve their financial problems but it 
does not eliminate them entirely that outside help would have become indis-
pensible. .  
 
The purchase of debt instruments of Member States in financial distress by 
the ECB is questionable from an economic, and more important, from a legal 
point of view. The longer the duration, the less legally justifiable is it. 
 
Financial support for Member States in severe financial distress might be 
acceptable as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism. A permanent support 
mechanism needs a basis in the primary law of the EU. 
 
The treatment of the risk of “sovereign” debt in the legal framework for finan-
cial institutions urgently needs improvement. Especially the capital require-
ments for credit institutions have to be adjusted. 
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